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FREEDOM OF WILL AND THE IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE
by
PAUL NOLAN, PH.D.*
There is no question in the mind of anyone who keeps abreast of
legal decisions that the whole question of insanity will have to be reexam-
ined. Since May 1st, 1954, there have been at least significant decisions
regarding insanity in the District of Columbia alone.' There seems
to be a wide difference of opinion from one jurisdiction to another. And
one thing is certain-whenever the reexamination take place, a great deal
of study will involve the question of the "irresistible impulse."
Taken at face value, the expression would seem to deny freedom
to the will under certain conditions. This raises a number of questions:
(1) To what extent does the teaching on freedom of the will apply?
(2) What is the teaching on freedom of the will?
(3) Can the human will be coerced?
(4) If the will cannot be coerced, can it be influenced?
(5) Does the expression "irresistible impulse" correctly designate
the state of mind of a man presented with the urge to commit
some act?
This article will be divided into five sections: first, a discussion of
that part of human activity in which it is affirmed that the will is free;
secondly, a discussion of free will; thirdly, a discussion on how the in-
tellect is said to move the will; fourthly, a discussion on the psychoso-
matic unity of man-which explains how the higher powers are influenced
by the lower powers; and fifthly, an application of these teachings to the
question of an "irresistible impulse."
It is to be noted that this discussion on freedom of the will is being
taken from the philosophical point of view, and with emphasis on the
Thomistic solution to the question.
I. Freedom of Will and Human Activity
When it is asserted that man has free will, the observation is not to
be understood as implying that man exercises freedom in all activities. On
the contrary, we know that a large number of human activities are not
the products of choice but follow a determined goal. The man who
stands on a ledge twenty feet above the ground will, if he steps off the
ledge, move toward the ground with the same necessity as a stone which
is dropped from the same ledge. A man does not ordinarily will his acts
0 Instructor in the School of Philosophy at the Catholic University of America. He holds
the Licentiate and the Doctorate degrees in Philosophy.
' Gunther v. U.S., Tatum v. U.S., Stewart v. U.S., Durham v. U.S.
of digestion; they take place without his deciding for their occurrence.
Free will is exercised upon those conscious motives which become
present to our minds. These conscious motives may, in turn be influenced
by unconscious factors, but the final choice is made by the will upon the
basis of those conscious judgments which the intellect entertains. In
other words, the will is free to act upon or to refuse to act upon those
motives which the mind presents. We define "motive" as "an object
which the mind presents to the will as something good and desirable."'
II. Freedom of the Will





I. Good is defined as 'that which satisfies", that which is appropri-
ate to a thing, that which is the object of the striving of a thing.
II. Universal Good is the infinite good. It is that which satifies
in every conceivable respect; that which fulfills every possible need we
might have. It is the ultimate goal of human striving.
III. Particular Goods: Those things which satisfy but to a lesser
degree than the universal good. Those goods which are less than the
infinitely good.
No particular good is capable of satisfying our needs in every way
(as the Universal Good can). Particular goods are not so intimately tied
up with human striving that we cannot do without them. Because they
cannot satisfy in every way they furnish at most only a temporary state
of happiness.'
Having made these definitions, we are ready to discuss freedom of
the will.
As far as the Universal Good is concerned, the human will is
strictly determined in its nature just as much as hydrogen and oxygen
are determined to produce water if the proper conditions are present. In
other words, there is no freedom of the will if the will were presented
by the mind with something which the mind recognized as the Infinite
(Universal) Good. The human will would tend toward the Infinite
Good with the same natural necessity as the stone falls downward if
dropped from a height.
2 Robert Edward Brennan, The Image of His Maker. Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing
Company, 1948. P. 223.
3 The foundation for freedom of the human will in respect to a particular good lies in
its natural determination toward the universal good. If the natural necessitating object of
the will is the Universal good, then no particular good can naturally determine it, because
no particular good can adequately replace the universal good.
The question of freedom of the will arises in connection with
Particular Goods.
We say that a man is not necessarily determined toward particular
goods because particular goods may be considered by the intellect under
two different aspects:
(1) According to the proportion of good which the Particu-
lar Good possesses in relation to the Universal Good.
(2) According to the relative lack of good which the particu-
lar good possesses in comparison to the Universal Good.
Thus, any particular good may be considered under its aspect of de-
sirability or under its aspect of relative undesirability in comparison to
the universal good.
Ordinarily the well-integrated human person does seek after a
particular good if the particular good does not interfere with his attain-
ing the ultimate good. For example, if an honest man is in a position
to earn honestly one million dollars, he will probably devise means to
obtain the million dollars. But if the honest man believed that he could
obtain the million only by dishonest means, then he would refuse to
obtain the million dollars by dishonest means.
Moreover, freedom of the will in connection with particular goods
involves two kinds of freedom:
(1) A man may will or not will a particular good (i.e., in the case
of the million dollars he is free to seek after it or to leave it
alone).
(2) If a man does will, he may will one particular good in prefer-
erence to another particular good, when several particular
goods are available to him.
The first freedom (1) is called freedom of exercise. The second freedom
(2) is called freedom of specification.
Let us consider these a bit further in relation to particular goods.
In freedom of exercise a man is free to seek or he is free to refuse a
particular good. It is in freedom of exercise that we have the whole root
of free will. The freedom of choice is his freedom to act or not to act
when he is faced with the opportunity of acquiring a particular good.
If a man refuses a particular good, there is no further question. But,
if a man chooses to seek after a particular good, there may or may not be
necessity involved in his attaining the particular good.
To illustrate these points let us take an example: Suppose that a
man is in the District of Columbia. He is presented with the idea of
going to Baltimore to buy a suit of clothing. He may refuse to go to
Baltimore (freedom of exercise). Then there is no further question.
But suppose our hypothetical man chooses to go to Baltimore
(freedom of exercise). He has available to him several modes of trans-
portation: he may (1) walk, (2) drive an automobile, (3) take a train,
(4) go by airplane (freedom of specification). He now has a choice
of adopting which of these means he desires (freedom of specification).
If all means are available to him, he is free to choose any of them to
achieve his goal, i.e., arrival at Baltimore.
Now let us take an illustration of necessity once a choice is made.
Suppose that the District of Columbia were separated from Baltimore
by a wide river, and suppose that the only available means of trans-
portation across the river were a raft. In this case, assuming that the
man has decided to go over to Baltimore, he will have to cross the river
by means of a raft since this is the only means of transportation available
to him for satisfying his desire to get to Baltimore. In this case, he was
initially free to decide whether he wanted to cross the river. But, once
having decided to cross the river, he was necessitated to cross it by
means of a raft.
Here is another point to consider: When an indivdiual is free to
specify the means by which he will attain a particular good, he need
not choose the means which he believes to be the most pleasurable or
the most effective. This is a matter of everyday experience.
In summary we may say that an individual is free to choose or to
refuse particular goods. Once he has chosen a particular good, he may
or may not be necessitated as to the means by which he will attain the
good. His necessity in respect to the means will depend upon whether or
not more than one means is available to him.
III. How the Intellect Moves the Will
Like any human appetite the will must be presented with some-
thing to strive for before the will carries out its own action. The will is
described as a "blind" faculty; and it is moved only by knowledge of
some sort. The knowledge is provided by the mind.
It is to be noted that when we say that the mind moves the will, we
do not mean that the mind exerts a force upon the will, like a billiard
cue pushing a billiard ball and putting the ball in motion.
The "motion" exerted by the mind is simply this: the mind in
apprehending the desirability of an object presents the object to the will
as something which the will may desire to strive after. The will is
moved by the mind when the mind presents an object as being desirable.
Once the will has an obect the will carries out its own action.
There are all kinds of objects (particular goods) which could
attract the human appetite for happiness. Some of these objects are
material and are attractive towards material powers. Other particular
goods are spiritual and attract our spiritual powers. When we are
hungry we find food attractive; when we are cold we find a warm fire
attractive. These are material goods. So, too, with emotions 4 -a man
may want a feeling of security, a feeling of being wanted. We may
call these "emotional goods". Or a man may seek "spiritual goods"
such as mastery of a science or the acquisition of good intellectual habits.
Each of these goods,-material, emotional, or spiritual-is only a
particular good. No one of them by itself could satisfy all human long-
ings and aspirations. At best it can only satisfy a particular desire, and
usually for only a short time.
IV. The Psychosomatic Unity of Man
Man is a creature composed of body and soul. Man is not a body
alone. Neither is he a soul alone. Neither is he a body plus a soul.
Rather we say that man is a composite being whose essential principles
are an incomplete spiritual substance (called the soul) and matter with
which the soul is so intimately united that the soul confers upon the
matter its existence.! In other words, when we consider the human being
in his state of existence upon this earth, we should think of the body
and soul as one unit and not as a house haunted by a ghost.
The psychosomatic phenomena which are the subject of so much
study in present-day medicine flow from this very nature of the human
composite.
The intellectual soul is the ultimate principle of living activity
in the human composite. In the intellectual soul itself are rooted the
faculties of intellect and of will. In the human composite which is "in-
formed" by the soul are rooted sensile and vegetal capacities. Vegetal,
sensile, and intellectual powers are all rooted in the one soul.!
"Moreover, when one psychological activity, is intense, another
is held up, which would not be the case were the principle of activity
not essentially identical."'
From this union of intellectual, sensile and vegetal faculties in the
one soul, come certain consequences: the same soul which is the source
of intellect and will is also the source of emotions. Emotions are rooted
in the soul-body composite. Emotions are shared by man in common
with the lower animals; though in man they have an excellence which
is due to their control by intellect and will.'
4Properly speaking, emotions and "emotional goods" should be classified in the
realm of the material world, philosophically speaking, since they are involved in the
conditions of matter. However, they are removed from the degree of materiality which we
first instanced.
5 Summa Theologica Ia Q. 76, art. 1, ad 5 um.
8 Ibid. Ia Q. 76, art. 4, corpus.
7 Quaestiones Quodlibetales IV, 1.
8 Summa Theologica Ia, Q. 76, art. 3, corpus.
o Ibid. Ia-IIae, Q. 74, art. 3, ad 1 um.
Moreover the soul is in each part of the body and throughout the
whole organism."0 Thus, in treating the nature of man, we must always
recognize that the physiological parts can exist in their own right. In spite
of the one identical form of the body as a whole, the parts will function
to a certain degree in their own right while their activity is coordinated
for the good of the organism as a whole. Nevertheless there is a sub-
ordination among the parts for the perfection of the whole. These parts
should be coordinated in their activity by the intellect which is the most
excellent power.11
However, the regulation which the intellect exercises over the
other powers is not coercive. It is more a cordination. The emotions
and drives have some autonomy of their own; and they may resist the
commands of reason."
In some men there may be an upsurge of the sensile elements into
the higher intellectual level so that the power of intellect may be strongly
influenced, if not overwhelmed upon occasion. A violent emotion can
weaken, distort or even totally impede the actions of the human mind."3
Thus we come to a possibility: An emotion or bodily condition may be
so vehement that it weakens (or distorts or impedes) the action of the
intellect so that the intellect is not judging an object in the same way as
it would if no other influences were at play. 4 The distortion of the
intellect by the emotions or by bodily conditions indirectly has an effect
upon will choices since the intellect, when influenced by the emotions
or bodily conditions, may represent only the desirability of an object
and fail to consider the object's aspects of undesirability.
The perfect rule of the powers of the body by the intellect is found
only in an individual who has achieved perfect integration, or what the
psychologist calls "emotional maturity."' " Emotion may be one of the
principles for disintegration of the harmony of a human personality. "
It is the fact that men experience sense pleasures more intensely than
they experience intellectual pleasures that there can be conflicts within
the human personality, and that most men experience only the lower
pleasures. 7 On the other hand, it is these same emotions which may be
10 Ibid. Ia Q. 76, art. 1, ad 5 urn.
IL Ibid. Ila Q. 2, art. 2, corpus.
12 Ibid. la, art. 3, ad 2 urn.
Is Ibid. Ia-llae, Q. 77, art. 2, corpus.
14 "According as a man is affected by an emotion, something seems to him fitting
which does not seem so when he is not so affected. And thus, that seems good to a man when
angered, which does not seem good to him when he is calm. It is in this way that the
emotion may move the will as regards the object." (Summa Theologica, la-IIae, Q. 9, art. 2,
corpus).
15 Cf. note (11).
16 Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae Q. 30, art. 1, ad 1 urn.
17 Ibid. Ila-Ilae, Q. 144, art. 4, ad 4 urn.
brought under the direction of the intellect, and when so directed, may
help to integrate the human personality.18
V. Irresistible Impulse
Let us now apply these views on the nature of man to the problem
of the "irresistible impulse" in relation to the unconscious mind.
The word "unconscious" itself has many meanings. Miller, in his
work Unconsciousness, shows that there are at least sixteen meanings
for the term and that, even in the realm of Psychoanalysis, the term is
subject to a variety of meanings."9
Vandervelt and Odenwald define "the unconscious" as follows:
"a collective noun to indicate the sum of dispositions, experiences, and
memories of the mind." 20
If we want to express this in another way, in reference to the
"irresistible impulse", the "unconscious" is the collective designation for
the storehouse of our past experiences, for the appetites of our vegetal
and sensile powers, for the bodily habits we have acquired and for the
innate bodily dispositions with which we are endowed. We have said
above that these lower powers and modifications of powers have some
autonomy of their own but which is surrendered to the regulation by
reason in a well-integrated adult personality. If these powers are not
subjected to control by reason, each of these irrational powers will seek
to fulfill its own natural tendency.
The individual who allows each of his irrational drives to go as
far as it wants, degenerates into a turmoil of emotions. In other words,
every man has a number of drives and wants which ask for satisfaction.
If he lets them go as far as they would want to, he finds himself now
pushed in one direction and now pushed in another.
The man who is in complete control of his impuses, subjects them
to judgment. He first judges whether the over-all good of his human
personality will benefit or will be destroyed by allowing a particular
drive to realize its full end. If the man judges that there will be a benefit
(or at least no harm) to the personality as a whole, he will probably
allow the particular drive to pursue its natural goal.
This kind of control by the intellect is not usually something which
happens over night. It requires training; and any human individual
can, by proper training, acquire the degree of control which is necessary
for him to coordinate his vegetal and sensile powers under the guidance
of reason. If an individual does not possess this coordination by reason,
18 Ibid. la-Ilae Q. 80, art. 2, corpus.
19 James Grier Miller, Unconsciousness New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1942. P. 43.
20 James A. Vandervelt and Robert P. Odenwald, Psychiatry and Catholicism. New York:
Mc-Graw-Hill Book Company, 1952. P. 151.
so that the control of reason is usurped by some sensile or vegetal
power, there may be a number of courses. To name just three, (1) im-
proper upbringing as a child, (2) bad environment, (3) the individual's
own wilfulness. Sentimentalists have too often emphasized the first two
reasons and almost deny the third. But it would seem closer to the truth
to say that the third reason is the more frequent.
In determining guilt one should attempt to learn whether the
individual's habitual lack of control (if it is habitual) is because he has
never known otherwise or because he preferred to give in to his lower
impulses. Another point to consider: to what extent was the intellect
weakened, influenced or impeded in judging rightly on the desirability
of his action? Again, was the individual responsible for putting himself
in a situation in which his judgment was so affected that he could
only see his action as desirable under the circumstances? Was this the
only time in which the judgment of the individual was hampered by
influence from the lower powers?
We know that even the grossly insane never completely lose their
powers of judgment. As the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
1949-1953 reported:
"It would be impossible to apply modern methods of care and treatment
in mental hospitals, and at the same time to maintain order and discipline,
if the great majority of the patients, even among the grossly insane did not
know what is forbidden by the rules and that, if they break them, they are
liable to forfeit some privilege."
21
We know that the insane possess some power of judgment, at least
in respect to some things-and consequently they possess some capacity
of will. As Vandervelt and Odenwald remark:
"The aim of modern psychiatry . . . is to educate the patients to develop
into responsible persons. Bu thow can this be achieved if the patient will
not cooperate? Cooperation, however, supposes a certain amount of will
power. Hence, psychiatrists themselves admit in practice that the mentally ill
are not completely devoid of will power."
2 2
Summary
It is incorrect to speak of a man's will as driven by an "irresistible
impulse". It is more correct to speak of a man as motivated by some
urge or idea which is so dominant in his field of consciousness that the
less desirable aspects of the urge or idea are left ignored. In other
words the will is not being forced to act against itself. Rather the will
moves towards the object because the object has been presented by reason
as something desirable.
21 Quoted by the Court in Durham v. the United States. Slip copy. P. 21.
22 Vandervelt and Odenwald, Op. Cit., P. 33.
